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ABSTRACT
In the present study, we examined the impact of emotion regulation on the intensity
bias in guilt and shame. Fifty-two undergraduates either forecasted their emotions
and emotion regulation following a guilt- and shame-eliciting situation or reported
their actual experienced emotions and employed emotion regulation. Results
showed a clear intensity bias, that is, forecasters predicted to experience more guilt
and shame than experiencers actually experienced. Furthermore, results showed
that forecasters predicted to employ less down-regulating emotion regulation (i.e.
less acceptance) and more up-regulating emotion regulation (i.e. more rumination)
than experiencers actually employed. Moreover, results showed that the intensity
differences between forecasted and experienced guilt and shame could be
explained (i.e. were mediated) by the differences between forecasted and actually
employed emotion regulation (i.e. acceptance and rumination). These findings
provide support for the hypothesis that the intensity bias can—at least in part—be
explained by the misprediction of future emotion regulation.
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When people make decisions they often attempt to
predict how the outcomes of these decisions will
make them feel and then base their decisions on
these forecasts. Ample research has shown, however,
that people often overestimate the intensity of their
future emotions—an intensity bias that has been
demonstrated in a wide variety of populations and
contexts (see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005, for over-
views). For example, candidates taking their driver’s
licence exam overestimated both their disappoint-
ment after failing the exam and their happiness after
passing it (Finkenauer, Gallucci, van Dijk, & Pollmann,
2007), romantic partners overestimated their unhappi-
ness after the dissolution of their relationship (Gilbert,
Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998), track ath-
letes overestimated their negative emotions following
an unsuccessful race (van Dijk, 2009; van Dijk, Finke-
nauer, & Pollmann, 2008), and following social
exclusion, undergraduates expected to experience
greater anger and sadness than they actually did
(van Dijk, van Dillen, Seip, & Rotteveel, 2012).
One possible reason why people overestimate the
intensity of their future emotions is that they fail to
anticipate how emotion regulation will affect their
future emotional experiences. If people fail to take
into account that they often regulate responses to
emotion-eliciting events in ways that attenuate their
impact, this should result in an overestimation of the
emotional intensity of these responses (cf. van Dijk
et al., 2008, 2012; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005). The
main objective of the current study therefore was to
examine to what extent people take into account
various emotion regulation strategies when predicting
their future emotional experiences, and whether fail-
ures to accurately assess their influence contribute
to people’s forecasting biases.
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Several studies provide initial support for the role
of emotion regulation in people’s overestimation of
their future emotions. It has been shown, for instance,
that individuals who generally use emotional proces-
sing coping strategies (e.g. reappraisal) recover more
effectively from negative events, but fail to foresee
this when asked to forecast their negative emotions,
thereby increasing their intensity bias (Hoerger,
Quirk, Lucas, & Carr, 2009). It has also been shown
that forecasters predicted equally strong affective
reactions to a news story about an accidental death
of a child for which caretakers could be blamed as
compared to a death for which no one could be
blamed, while experiencers were actually less dis-
tressed by a blameworthy death than by a blameless
one (Gilbert et al., 1998). Perhaps, a blameless acciden-
tal death is more difficult to explain and subsequently
to regulate than a blameworthy one, but forecasters
failed to foresee this. Our own research, moreover,
showed that forecasters—as compared to experien-
cers—overestimated their anger following social
exclusion, but underestimated their reappraisal of
this event (van Dijk et al., 2012). This study showed
that for experiencers greater reappraisal was associ-
ated with less experienced anger, whereas for forecas-
ters predicted reappraisal was unrelated to the
intensity of predicted anger. These studies suggest—
in line with our hypothesis—that people might
indeed overestimate the intensity of their future
emotions because they fail to anticipate how
emotion regulation will affect their future emotions.
Another finding in support of our hypothesis comes
from research on emotional intelligence. For instance, it
has been shown that individuals who performed well
on a test of emotion management (a component of
emotional intelligence) showed less bias in predicting
their future emotions than those who performed
poorly on this test (Dunn, Brackett, Asthon-James,
Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007). Possibly, individuals
who are good in emotion management recognise
better that emotions can be regulated and are likely
to take this into account when forecasting their
emotions, thereby decreasing their intensity bias.
In the present research, we aimed to provide
further support for the role of emotion regulation
strategies in the intensity bias. We examined this in
the context of guilt and shame—two negative self-
conscious emotions that are often experienced
together but differ in their focus on either behaviour
or self (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Guilt is eli-
cited by the appraisal of an emotion-eliciting situation
as a failure of behaviour. It involves a negative evalu-
ation of specific behaviour and is typically
accompanied by feelings of tension, regret and
remorse, and action tendencies to confess, apologise,
and undo the consequences of the behaviour. Shame,
on the other hand, is elicited by the appraisal of an
emotion-eliciting event as a failure of self. It involves
a negative evaluation of the global self and is typically
accompanied by feelings of worthlessness and power-
lessness, and action tendencies to deny, hide, or
escape the shame-eliciting situation (Lewis, 1971;
Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004).
Emotion regulation refers to “the process by which
individuals influence which emotions they have, when
they have them and how they experience and express
these emotions” (Gross, 1998a, p. 275), and includes—
amongst others—reappraisal, acceptance, suppres-
sion, and rumination. In the present research, we
focus specifically on these strategies to test the
hypothesis that the intensity bias can be explained
by the misprediction of future emotion regulation.
Reappraisal, suppression, and acceptance are
emotion regulation strategies aimed at the down-
regulation of negative emotions, whereas rumination
tends to up-regulate negative emotions. Reappraisal
involves cognitively transforming the perception of
the situation to alter its emotional impact and research
has indicated that reappraising a (potential) distres-
sing situation attenuates negative emotions (Gross,
1998b; Gross & John, 2003; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964).
Suppression refers to the intentional inhibition of
expressive and/or experiential aspects of one’s
ongoing affective responses and has been shown to
effectively reduce negative emotions (Braams,
Blechert, Boden, & Gross, 2012; Dunn, Billotti,
Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009), as does acceptance
(Braams et al., 2012), which refers to thoughts of
resigning yourself to what happened. Lastly, rumina-
tion is “a mode of responding to distress that involves
repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of
distress and on the possible causes and consequences
of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008, p. 400), a
strategy that usually enhances the intensity of nega-
tive emotions (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
The current research
In our current research, we confronted participants
with negative feedback about their performance
on several self-relevant tasks (i.e. shame-inducing
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feedback) and with feedback that due to their poor
performance they disadvantaged another person (i.e.
guilt-inducing feedback). Subsequently, participants
were asked to report the intensity of their (experi-
enced or forecasted) guilt and shame and the extent
to which they (would) use four types of emotion regu-
lation—reappraisal, suppression, acceptance, and
rumination.
To safeguard our research—as much as possible—
against potential methodological confounds, we used
multiple stringent criteria in our study. First, asking
participants to forecast their future emotions might
affect their actual experienced emotions. Therefore,
we used a between-participants design in which par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to either a forecast
or experience condition. Second, participants’ mood
might influence their forecasts and/or experiences of
emotions. Therefore, we assessed participants’ mood
prior to the guilt- and shame-eliciting situation,
which enables us to control for this potential influ-
ence. Third, forecasters and experiencers were both
asked to report their emotions and emotion regulation
in response to the specific focal event. Explicitly refer-
ring to the specific focal event in both the forecasting
and experiencing questions prevents different
interpretations of these questions (Levine, Lench,
Kaplan, & Safer, 2012).
In our current research we tested three hypotheses.
First, we hypothesised that forecasters predict to
experience more guilt and shame than experiencers
actually experience. Second, we hypothesised that
forecasters fail to anticipate how they can regulate
emotion-eliciting events in to attenuate their future
impact. More specifically, we hypothesised that
forecasters predict to employ less down-regulating
emotion regulation (i.e. less reappraisal, less accep-
tance, and less suppression) and more up-regulating
emotion regulation (i.e. rumination) than experiencers
actually employed. Third, we hypothesise that the
intensity differences between forecasted and experi-
enced guilt and shame (i.e. the intensity bias) can be
explained (i.e. are mediated) by the differences
between forecasted and actually employed emotion
regulation.
Method
Participants, design, and overview procedure
Fifty-two undergraduates were randomly assigned to
either the forecast condition ( forecasters, n = 28) or
experience condition (experiencers, n = 24).1 Upon
arrival at the laboratory, participants first gave
informed consent and were asked to complete
several questionnaires.2 Subsequently, they were con-
fronted with a guilt- and shame-eliciting situation and
completed a questionnaire concerning the dependent
variables. Upon completion of this questionnaire par-
ticipants were fully debriefed, thanked, and rewarded
for their participation. Our sample size was deter-
mined by the number of participants we could
include in our study in one week. We did not
exclude any data and report all manipulations and
measures used in the study.
Mood assessment
To assess participants’ mood before being confronted
with the guilt- and shame-eliciting situation, they
completed—using seven-point scales (1 = not at all;
7 = very much)—a 20-item measure of positive and
negative affect (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988; Cronbach’s α = .76; M = 5.17, SD = 0.58).
Experimental manipulation: forecasting vs.
experiencing a guilt- and shame-eliciting
situation
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and
were greeted by a male experimenter and an
alleged other female participant (in reality a confeder-
ate of the experimenter who was trained to interact
with participants in a consistent way). Experiencers
were asked to go, together with the alleged other
participant, to another room to complete three differ-
ent tasks. Upon arrival in the room, they received
further instructions (see below). Forecasters were
accompanied to an individual cubicle and asked to
wait for further instructions from the experimenter.
Subsequently, both experiencers and forecasters
were confronted with the same guilt- and shame-eli-
citing situation. The crucial difference between experi-
encers and forecasters was that experiencers were
confronted with the real situation, whereas forecasters
were asked to read a very detailed description of the
situation and asked to imagine it as vividly as possible.
The experimenter was trained to verbally provide the
exact same information to experiencers as forecasters
read in the written description. Below we describe the
most relevant elements of the situation (see Sup-
plementary Online Materials for a full description of
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the situation that forecasters were asked to read and
that experiencers were actually confronted with).
Guilt- and shame-eliciting situation
After participants (read that they) went to another
room, the experimenter explained to them that
there would be three different tasks—a math task, a
language task, and a puzzle task that tested spatial
awareness—each of which would measure a different
self-relevant skill. Participants were then told that if
their joint average score was above 60% they both
would earn €10 extra. However, if their joint average
score was below 60% none of them would earn €10
extra, even if one of them had an individual score
above 60%.
For experiencers, the situation continued with actu-
ally conducting the three tasks, whereas forecasters
read a detailed description of these tasks (including
specific information concerning the instructions and
content of each task). Upon completion of the tasks
participants received (or read about) individual feed-
back on their own performance, the performance of
the (alleged) other participant, and whether or not
they had earned the bonus. In this feedback, partici-
pants were told (or read) that the average score on
these three tasks was 50% and that their score was
well below this average (i.e. 34%)—feedback that
likely elicits shame. Additionally, participants were
told (or read) that the other participant had a score
well above average (i.e. 82%). However, because
their joint average performance was below 60% (i.e.
58%) none of them earned €10 extra—feedback that
likely elicits guilt. Upon experiencing the guilt- and
shame-eliciting situation (or vividly imagining it), par-
ticipants were asked to complete the dependent vari-
ables in individual cubicles.
Dependent variables
All participants answered the same set of questions
that were worded slightly differently for forecasters
and experiencers. Forecasters were asked how they
would respond to the situation, whereas experiencers
were asked about their actual felt responses. All
dependent variables were assessed on seven-point
scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) using paper-and-
pencil questionnaires.3
Guilt and shame
Guilt was assessed with seven items: “I feel guilty,” “I
feel if I did something wrong,” “I should have acted
differently during the task,” “I feel responsible for the
outcome of the task,” “I let the other team member
down,” “I want to apologize to the other team
member,” and “I want to make up to the other team
member” (Cronbach’s α = .89). Shame was also
assessed with seven items: (1) “I feel ashamed,” (2) “I
feel worthless,” (3) “I could sink into the ground,” (4)
“I would like to disappear into nothing,” (5) “I feel
bad about myself,” (6) “I presented myself badly
during the task,” and (7) “I think the other team mem-
ber sees me as incompetent” (Cronbach’s α = .90).
All items were based on earlier research on guilt
and shame (e.g. Tangney et al., 2007) and tailored to
fit the present situation and interspersed with five
filler items (assessing positive feelings; e.g. “I feel
proud”) to avoid suspicion that we were interested
in negative emotions only and that the negative feed-
back might not be real.
Reappraisal, suppression, acceptance, and
rumination
All items were based on earlier work on emotion regu-
lation (e.g. Braams et al., 2012; Gross & John, 2003;
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; van Dijk et al., 2012), tai-
lored to fit the present situation and interspersed with
four filler items (e.g. “a puzzle task is not really my
thing”) to avoid suspicion that we were interested in
regulation of negative events only.
Reappraisal was assessed with five items, “I think I
learned something from the task,” “Actually the task
and the outcome of the task are not that important,”
“I think mostly about what I did well,” “I try to see
the positive side of the current situation,” and “I try
to think of something nice, something which has
nothing to do with the current situation.” Reliability
analysis revealed that these five items had a low
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .32), therefore
we decided not to include these items in our ana-
lyses.4 Suppression was assessed with two items, “I
try to be as calm as possible” and “I try to control
my emotions as best as I can” (Spearman’s rho = .58,
p < .001). Acceptance was also assessed with two
items, “I can accept the current situation” and “I can
live with the current situation” (Spearman’s rho = .85,
p < .001). Rumination was assessed with five items, “I
think mostly about what I did wrong,” “I think about
how I would do things differently next time,” “I think
about how I can deal best with the current situation,”
“I will think a lot about the task and the outcome of
the task,” and “The task and the outcome of the task
COGNITION AND EMOTION 619
will be on my mind for a long time” (Cronbach’s
α = .85).
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicted that forecasters expect to
experience more guilt and shame than experiencers
actually do. A multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) with condition as independent variable
and guilt and shame as dependent variables indeed
showed a statistically significant multivariate differ-
ence between the forecasters and experiencers, F(2,
49) = 10.40, p < .001, h2p = .30. Univariate one-way
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed that (i) fore-
casters indicated more guilt (M = 5.70, SD = 0.97)
than experiencers (M = 4.22, SD = 1.36; F(1, 51) =
20.97, p < .001, h2p = .30) and (ii) forecasters indicated
more shame (M = 5.26, SD = 1.12) than experiencers
(M = 4.04, SD = 1.42; F(1, 51) = 11.80, p = .001,
h2p = .19).5
Hypothesis 2 predicted that forecasters expect to
use less down-regulating and more up-regulating
emotion regulation than experiencers actually
employ. This was also the case. A MANOVA with con-
dition as independent variable and the indices for sup-
pression, acceptance, and rumination as dependent
variables showed a statistically significant multivariate
difference between forecasters and experiencers, F(3,
48) = 10.08, p < .001, h2p = .39. Univariate one-way
ANOVAs revealed that whereas (i) forecasters (M =
5.46, SD = 0.87) and experiencers (M = 5.08, SD =
1.03) did not differ on suppression, F(1, 51) = 2.09,
p = .15, h2p = .04; (ii) forecasters indicated (close to
statistically significant) less acceptance (M = 4.39, SD
= 1.36) than experiencers (M = 5.15, SD = 1.43; F(1,
51) = 3.76, p = .06, h2p = .07); and (iii) forecasters indi-
cated significantly more rumination (M = 5.46, SD =
0.77) than experiencers (M = 3.79, SD = 1.36; F(1, 51)
= 30.43, p < .001, h2p = .38).
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the differences in
forecasted and experienced guilt and shame are
mediated by differences in forecasted and employed
emotion regulation. To test for these mediations, we
followed the recommendations of Preacher and
Hayes (2008), who suggest using a bootstrapping
procedure to compute confidence intervals around
the indirect effects (i.e. the paths through the
mediators). If zero falls outside an interval, mediation
can be said to be present. We used the SPSS macros
that Preacher and Hayes provide for this procedure.
In these analyses, condition (forecasters vs.
experiencers) was the independent variable, guilt
or shame were the dependent variables and sup-
pression, acceptance, and rumination were the
mediators. We used bootstrapped mediation ana-
lyses with 10,000 bootstrap resamples and bias-cor-
rected and accelerated intervals.
A first analysis demonstrated that the effect of con-
dition on guilt was mediated by acceptance (95% CI =
[−.28, −.004]) and rumination (95% CI = [−.84, −.20]),
but not by suppression (95% CI = [−.14, .02]). More-
over, the significant direct effect of condition on
guilt (β =−.74, t =−4.58, p < .001) was reduced to
non-significance (β =−.17, t =−1.12, p = .27) when
the mediators were added to the model. A second
analysis demonstrated that the effect of condition
on shame was also mediated by acceptance (95% CI
= [−.32, −.01]) and rumination (95% CI = [−.97,
−.25]), but again not by suppression (95% CI = [−.04,
.09]). Moreover, the significant direct effect of con-
dition on shame (β =−.61, t =−3.44, p = .0012) was
reduced to non-significance (β = .06, t = 0.41, p = .68)
when the mediators were added to the model.
Taken together, these mediation analyses indicate
that the differences in forecasted and experienced
guilt and shame are mediated by the differences in
forecasted and employed emotion regulation (i.e.
acceptance and rumination) and provide support for
our third hypothesis (see Figure 1 for relevant statistics
concerning the effects of condition on the mediators
and the direct effects of the mediators on guilt [top
panel] and shame [bottom panel]).
Discussion
Supporting our hypotheses we found that, (i) forecas-
ters predicted to experience more guilt and shame
than experiencers actually did; (ii) forecasters pre-
dicted to employ less down-regulating (i.e. less accep-
tance) and more up-regulating (i.e. more rumination)
emotion regulation strategies than experiencers actu-
ally did; and (iii) the intensity bias in guilt and shame
was mediated by these differences in emotion regu-
lation. This indicates that forecasters overestimate
their future guilt and shame because they underesti-
mate their future use of down-regulation strategies
and overestimate their future use of up-regulation
strategies.
The present findings support the contention that
overestimating the intensity of future emotions can
be explained—at least in part—by the misprediction
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of future emotion regulation (see also, van Dijk et al.,
2008; 2012; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005). In other
words, people mispredict beforehand how they will
cope with emotional events and this bias leads them
to overestimate the intensity of future emotions.
Moreover, the present findings are the first to demon-
strate an intensity bias in negative self-conscious
emotions.
Figure 1. Bootstrapped mediation analyses with condition as independent variable, suppression, acceptance, and rumination as mediators and
guilt (top panel) and shame (bottom panel) as dependent variables.
Note: Suppression, acceptance and rumination were entered simultaneously as mediators in the analyses. Numbers above the lines represent
standardised beta coefficients, whereas numbers in the boxes represent 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effects. †p = .058; *p < .05;
**p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Recently, Levine and her colleagues challenged the
robustness of the intensity bias in affective forecasting
(Levine et al., 2012; see for a comment, Wilson &
Gilbert, 2013). They posit that many earlier demon-
strations of the intensity bias are due to a methodo-
logical artefact and argue that the intensity bias is
mainly due to participants’ different interpretations
of the forecasting and experiencing questions (i.e.
they are asked to predict their emotions with specific
reference to a focal event, but are later asked to report
their experienced emotions without this reference).
However, the present findings cannot be adequately
explained by the reasoning of Levine et al. (2012),
because in our research both forecasters and experi-
encers were explicitly asked to report their (fore-
casted) emotions with specific reference to a focal
event. This—in addition to the use of several other
stringent methodological criteria (i.e. the use of a
between-participants design and the assessment of
prior mood)—makes it highly unlikely that the
present demonstration of the intensity bias was due
to a methodological artefact.
In our view, people’s failure to anticipate how
various emotion regulation strategies affect their
future emotions is a more powerful explanation of
our present findings and likely also for other demon-
strations of the intensity bias. This can, for example,
explain why the intensity bias is typically larger for
negative emotions than for positive emotions (e.g.
Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; van Dijk
et al., 2008). Although people are motivated to regu-
late any emotional event, they are especially motiv-
ated to regulate emotion-evoking events that are
potentially threatening for their well-being (Wilson &
Gilbert, 2003). Moreover, an explanation of the fore-
casting bias in terms of emotion regulation can also
explain why there are individual differences in fore-
casting accuracy—that is, why individuals who are
good in emotion management show less intensity
bias (Dunn et al., 2007). Presumably, these individuals
anticipate their actual emotion regulation more
accurately.
Possible limitations and directions for future
research
Our research provides clear support for an intensity
bias in affective forecasting and the role of emotion
regulation strategies therein, specifically of rumination
and acceptance. Our findings are, however, less con-
clusive about the role of reappraisal and suppression
in participants’ overestimation of their guilt and
shame. Our earlier research suggested a role of reap-
praisal in the intensity bias (van Dijk et al., 2012), but
due to the low internal consistency of the reappraisal
items in the current study we could not examine this
emotion regulation strategy in our hypothesis-
testing analyses. Future studies could use different,
preferably pre-tested, items to further examine the
exact role of reappraisal in the intensity bias. Our
research did not reveal any significant results concern-
ing suppression. Why this is the case, we can only
speculate. On possibility is, for example, that decreas-
ing rumination is more effective in down-regulating
guilt and shame than suppression. Both guilt and
shame are negatively valenced, self-conscious
emotions and both have been related to rumination
(Tangney et al., 2007). It could also be the case that
suppression is a form of regulation that comes rela-
tively late in the emotion process and is particularly
effective in modifying the behavioural response of
emotions and perhaps less effective in attenuating
the experience of emotions (Gross & John, 2003).
Future research could also address these issues by
examining whether certain emotion regulation pro-
cesses have a stronger impact on the intensity bias
than others and whether this impact differs for differ-
ent specific emotions.
Conclusions and closing remarks
The present research indicates that people tend to
overestimate the intensity of their future emotions
because they are inaccurate in anticipating how they
will cope with emotional events. Our current study is
the first to demonstrate the intensity bias in guilt
and shame and the first that examined the intensity
bias in relation to both down- and up-regulating
emotion regulation processes. The current findings
advance our knowledge of affective forecasting by
providing valuable insights in the role of emotion
regulation in the intensity bias.
In closing, we want to remark that we do not argue
that people cannot accurately predict their future
emotions. We do, however, argue that they frequently
mispredict their intensity. Sometimes people underes-
timate the intensity of their future emotions, but more
often they overestimate their future emotions. Our
present findings show—in line with earlier theorizing
—that people’s intensity bias can be due to their
underestimation of the extent to which their
emotion regulation processes help them to down-
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regulate their emotions (van Dijk et al., 2008, 2012;
Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005). Affective forecasting
inaccuracy can be regarded as an error, but ample
research has shown that people are “objectively” inac-
curate about a range of predictions. For example,
people tend to be (unrealistically) optimistic and
have (unwarranted) illusions of control, however,
these errors and biases can serve important self-regu-
latory functions for people. People seem not to be
wired psychologically to be accurate or happy, but
to survive in a social world. Overestimating one’s
future emotions could therefore also serve a self-regu-
latory function (van Dijk et al., 2008; Wilson & Gilbert,
2003, 2005). For instance, it could motivate people to
avoid negative events to prevent the experience of
(anticipated) strong negative emotions or to approach
positive events to achieve the experience of (antici-
pated) strong positive emotions. Thus, although
turning a blind eye to our emotion regulation pro-
cesses can be regarded as an error when we look in
the crystal ball of our emotional lives, it is perhaps
not such a grave one.
Notes
1. Because our confederate was female, we decided to include
only female participants in our study.
2. Prior to their mood assessment, participants completed—as
part of several different student projects—multiple
questionnaires.
3. There were several missing values, these were replaced by
either the mean of the whole sample (missing values on
the PANAS) or the mean of condition participants were
assigned to (remaining missing values).
4. Analyses conducted with the individual items separately
yielded only a significant difference between conditions for
the reappraisal item “Actually the task and outcome of the
task are not that important”. Forecasters indicated less reap-
praisal (M = 3.64, SD = 1.31) than experiencers (M = 4.50, SD
= 1.38; F(1, 51) = 5.25, p < .03, h2p = .10). However, given the
psychometric difficulties with analyses of single items, this
finding should be treated with caution.
5. All reported analyses were also conducted with mood as a
covariate. Because these analyses yielded similar results, we
only report the analyses without mood as a covariate.
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